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Abstract
This study uses John Rawls’ behind-the-veil of ignorance device as a fairness
criterion to evaluate social policies and applies it to a contracting model in
which the terms equality of opportunity and equality of result are well deﬁned.
The results suggest that fairness and inequality—even extreme inequality—are
compatible. In a static world, when incentives must be provided, fairness im-
plies equality of opportunity, but inequality of result. In a dynamic world of
long-lived individuals, fairness implies not only inequality of result, but also,
eventually, inﬁnite inequality of result. If each period of the dynamic model is
interpreted as a generation, then eventual inﬁnite inequality holds for opportu-
nity as well, as long as fairness is from the perspective of the ﬁrst generation. If
preferences of later generations are taken into account, then inequality of op-
portunity still occurs, although not at extreme levels.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.While conceding that normative issues like fairness or jus-
ticemaybeappropriateconsiderationswhendiscussingso-
cial policies informally, economists have a strong tradition
of shying away from such considerations when they eval-
uatepoliciesformally.Instead,economiststraditionallysee
theirexpertise asinobjectivelyevaluating whetherasocial
policy is efficient. Perhaps the best illustration of this ten-
dency to avoid normative issues is the familiar Edgeworth
box diagram. In an endowment economy with two goods
and two agents, efficiency implies that each agent’s mar-
ginal rate of substitution between the two goods must
equal the other agent’s. If both agents like both goods, then
this equality can occur when the allocation of the goods is
quite unequal, such as when either agent has almost all of
the aggregate endowment of both goods. Economists tend
tobewillingtocriticizeallocationsinwhichmarginalrates
of substitution are not equated (since then both agents can
be made better off by an allocation in which these rates are
equated). But economists tend to be unwilling, at least for-
mally, to choose among the many efficient allocations.
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Nevertheless, starting with the work of Edward Green
(1987), economists have developed a large literature on
dynamic contracting theory which has implications for in-
equality of consumption across households and, I argue,
on whether such inequality is fair.
2 In that literature, soci-
ety faces a trade-off between insurance and incentives,
and inequality results as the product of efficient mecha-
nisms intended to induce good behavior. I argue here that
the efficiency notion of these studies corresponds closely
(but not perfectly) to the fairness notion of political phi-
losopher John Rawls (1971). If my argument is accepted,
then dynamic contracting theory has something to say
about fairness as well as efficiency. It says that fairness
and inequality are not incompatible: a fair allocation can
imply inequality. But more surprisingly, the theory says
that a fair allocation can imply extreme inequality of both
opportunity and result.
To make this argument, I present a model which al-
lows the consideration of equality of opportunity and re-
sult. The model economy has a ﬁxed amount of land that
is a necessary input to household production; that is, a
household with little or no land has little or no opportunity
to produce.
3 Thus, in the model, one household having
more land than another implies inequality of opportunity
while one household having more consumption than an-
other implies inequality of result. This ﬁxed amount of
land is also useful for deriving my most extreme conclu-
sion: in the fair allocation, incentive issues cause the land
allocation of almost all households to converge to zero,
implying eventual inﬁnite inequality of both opportunity
and result.
Rawls’ Fairness vs. Economists’ Efficiency
To get to that extreme conclusion, I must establish a con-
nectionbetweenRawls’notionoffairnessandeconomists’
notion of efficiency in models of dynamic contracting.
Rawls’ notion of fairness generally corresponds to econo-
mists’ notion of ex ante efficiency.
To see this, consider a world in which, by pure luck,
some are born with valuable skills (the skilled) and some,
with less valuable skills (the unskilled). Again, in evaluat-
ing alternative social policies, economists tend to avoid
considering what is the best transfer from the skilled to
the unskilled because that involves making a value judg-
ment: best from whose perspective? Instead, economists
tend to evaluate social policies in terms of ex post effi-
ciency. Economists are willing to call social policy A “in-
ferior to” social policy B if both the skilled and the un-
skilled weakly prefer social policy B (and at least one
group strictly prefers policy B). But economists are tradi-
tionally silent on the ranking of these policies if one group
prefers policy Aand the other, policy B(as is true if policy
A is a transfer from the skilled to the unskilled and policy
B, a zero transfer).
Rawls (1971), however, is quite willing to consider the
best transfer from the skilled to the unskilled. His method
is to step back behind “a veil of ignorance” to a world in
which everyone knows the two groups will exist, but no
one knows which group anyone will be in. By deﬁnition,
many things may be uncertain from behind the veil, but
everyone is in the same informational position. In such a
world, there is no question of “best from whose perspec-
tive?” There is only one perspective—that of individuals
who see all possible outcomes as possibly happening to
them. This common perspective, then, gives a way to rank
social policies that economists are traditionally loathe to
rank. Social policy A is better than social policy B if and
only if it is better from the behind-the-veil perspective,
and the best social policy is the one that maximizes wel-
fare from that perspective.
Still, in some types of economic problems, notably,
those involving insurance, Rawls’ notion of fairness cor-
responds to the economist’s notion of ex ante efficiency.
Economists have little reticence about arguing that when
households pool risk regarding home ﬁres and as a result
transfers go from households which do not have ﬁres to
households which do, this is efficient risk-sharing. In re-
ality, people actually do make insurance contracts before
they know which group they are going to be in. Formally,
Rawls’ criterion amounts to simply pretending that the
skilled vs. unskilled scenario (in which everyone knows
which group they are in) is the same as the ﬁre vs. no ﬁre
scenario (in which no one knows, at the point of contract-
ing, which group they are in) and choosing the transfer
from the skilled to the unskilled to correspond with the
efficient insurance arrangement that people would have
chosen if they had had an opportunity to choose.
I depart here from Rawls’ notion of fairness regarding
the preferences of those behind the veil. I assume that
preferences regarding risk and time are the same for those
in the world and those behind the veil and take forms
commonly assumed by economists. Rawls argues that in-
dividuals behind the veil will be more risk averse than in-
dividuals observed in the world and will not discount the
future. (In fact, Rawls argues that behind the veil, individ-
uals will be inﬁnitely risk averse, or care only about maxi-
mizing welfare in their own worst-case scenario.) This is
how Rawls (1971, pp. 152ff) derives his familiar maximin
criterion: policy Ais preferred to policy Bfrom behind the
veil if and only if the welfare of the worst outcome for
any individual under policy A exceeds the welfare of the
worst outcome under policy B. Here, I show that if more
reasonable levels of risk aversion and some discounting
are allowed, then what is chosen from behind the veil can
change drastically.A Static Model
I start by considering a simple contracting model, an econ-
omy with only one time period. Even in this simple model,
we shall see that fairness implies some inequality.
This economy has a continuum of identical households
and a single divisible unit of land. The single consumption
good cis produced by households using land not allocated
to private use. Speciﬁcally, if z is the household’s land
allocation and θ∈ {0,¯ θ } is the fraction of the household’s
landallocatedtoproductionoftheconsumptiongood,then
the household’s production is
(1) y = zθ µ
whereµ∈ {0,1}isanindependentrandomvariable(across
households) and 0 < ¯ θ <1 .L e t0<π L < 1 denote the
probability of realization µ = 0 and π H =1−π L. In words,
equation (1) says that a household’s output y equals z¯ θ if
fraction ¯ θ of the household’s land is allocated to produc-
tion (as opposed to none of it being so allocated) and the
random variable µ is drawn to be one instead of zero. Oth-
erwise (because either θ = 0 or µ = 0), a household’s out-
put equals zero. Let pL(θ )=1−( π Hθ /¯ θ ) and pH(θ )=π Hθ /¯ θ
denote the endogenous probabilities of low and high out-
puts.
In this model, households care about their consumption
and the amount of land allocated to their private use. A
household’s preference-ordering over certain pairs of con-
sumption and land allocated to consumption (c,z(1−θ ))
is determined by the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation
c
α [z(1−θ )]
1−α , where 0 < α < 1. As I argued above, to be
most consistent with Rawls’ concept of fairness, prefer-
ences over risk should be deﬁned from two perspectives:
in the world and from behind the veil. This would allow
households to be more risk averse regarding allocations
from behind the veil as opposed to in the world. However,
deﬁning preferences from both perspectives is technically
difficult and conceptually problematic. So here I focus
solely on the situation in which preferences toward risk
from behind the veil correspond to those in the world. In
the world, a household’s preference-ordering over lotteries
is determined by the expected value of the constant rela-
tive risk aversion speciﬁcation




where U is the household’s utility and 0 < σ <1 .
4
By Rawls’ criterion, for an allocation to be fair, it must
be symmetric—each household must be treated identically
fromthebehind-the-veilperspective.Iftheallocationisde-
terministic (involves no lotteries), then symmetry implies
that the land allocation and division, z and θ , are common
acrosshouseholds.Thisimpliesthatanallocationissimply
a vector (z,θ ,cL,cH) denoting each household’s land allo-
cation, land division, and consumption given a low (zero)
andhigh(z¯ θ )outputrealization.Sinceconsumptionoccurs
after production, a household’s consumption can depend
on its observable production in a deterministic symmetric
allocation.However,asymmetricallocationcould,inprin-
ciple, be random. If a lottery is involved, some households
could receive large land allocations while others receive
small ones. As long as each household faces the same
odds, though, such a random allocation can be considered
symmetric. For now, I restrict consideration to determinis-
tic allocations. Later, I will show that random allocations
will never be chosen from behind the veil.
Suppose θ and µ are publicly observable. Then an ex
ante efficient allocation (z*,θ *,c* L,c* H) solves
(3) max(z,θ ,cL,cH)pL(θ )U(cL,z(1−θ ))+pH(θ )U(cH,z(1−θ ))
subject to the resource constraints
(4) z ≤ 1
and
(5) pL(θ )cL + pH(θ )cH − pH(θ )zθ≤ 0.
In words, an ex ante efficient allocation maximizes ex an-
te utility subject to resource constraints on land (4) and
the consumption good (5).
It is nearly immediate that a solution to this problem
implies that z =1 ,θ = ¯ θ , and cL = cH = π H¯ θ , or that




(which depends only on their realization of µ) does not
serve the purpose of maximizing households’ utility. It
only makes households less happy. Thus, a fair allocation
in this economy has not only (by assumption) equality of
opportunity—every household has the same income-pro-
ducing possibilities as every other since all have the same
landallocationandthesamelanddivision—butalsoequal-
ity of result—income is redistributed so that all households
have the same consumption.
What if a household’s θ and µ are not publicly observ-
able, but instead are observed by only that household? In
particular, suppose that a household can surreptitiously di-
vert land intended for production to private use.
6 Now θ
can no longer be perfectly inferred from observed output.
If a household has positive output, it must have chosen θ
= ¯ θ , but if a household has zero output, this does not im-
ply that θ = 0 since zero output can also occur due to µ =
0. Thus, for an allocation to be feasible, when it speciﬁes
a land division θ , actually choosing θ must be individually
rational.
Speciﬁcally, an allocation (z,θ ,cL,cH) is incentive-com-
patible if and only if
(6) pL(θ )U(cL,z(1−θ ))+pH(θ )U(cH,z(1−θ ))≥ U(cL,z).
The left side of this incentive constraint is the expected
utility of setting θ to the value speciﬁed by the allocation,
and the right side is the certain utility of setting θ =0 ,
which gives the household the low output with certainty.
(If the allocation speciﬁes θ = 0, then the left and right
sides of (6) are automatically equal.)
Imposing the incentive constraint implies that cH > cL.
Thus, there is inequality of result.
7 If an allocation speci-
ﬁes that θ = ¯ θ and cL = cH > 0, then the allocation is not
incentive-compatible since the household is better off set-
ting θ = 0 and receiving the added utility associated with
using all of its land for personal use. (That is, U(c,z)>
U(c,z(1−¯ θ )) if c > 0.) Thus, equality of result is feasible
only if θ = 0. Then, since production equals zero, cL = cH
= 0. But this allocation gives a utility of zero. Society canalways do better by setting θ = ¯ θ and setting cH sufficient-
ly greater than cL to satisfy the incentive constraint. Since
when z = 1 two constraints on allocations (expressions (5)
and (6)) remain and, with θ = ¯ θ , two choice variables (cL
and cH) remain, maximizing expected utility essentially
amounts to requiring the resource and incentive con-
straints to hold with equality. (Making cH/cL greater than
necessary to provide incentives only decreases expected
utility.) Thus, in this model, inequality of result makes
production possible.
But what of equality of opportunity? So far this has
been simply assumed by setting z and θ common for all
households. To prove that equality of opportunity is in
fact optimal, I examine the dual of the primal program-
ming problem deﬁned by maximizing utility subject to re-
source and incentive constraints. (For an elaboration of
this method, see the 1992 work of Andrew Atkeson and
Robert Lucas and my 1994 work.)
Suppose that an allocation (z,θ ,cL,cH) maximizes (3)
subject to the resource constraints (4) and (5) and the in-
centive constraint (6). Further, suppose that the allocation
delivers a maximized utility w* and a shadow price of
land q, where q is the relative value of the Lagrange mul-
tipliers on constraints (4) and (5). This allocation has a re-
source cost (in terms of the consumption good) of pz +
pL(θ )cL + pH(θ )cH − pH(θ )zθ . Standard arguments imply
that the utility-maximizing allocation (z,θ ,cL,cH) must also
minimize the resource cost of providing w* subject to the
incentive constraint (6). Otherwise, the surplus resources
could be redistributed to households to get higher levels
of utility.
This cost-minimization problem can be stated for arbi-
trary w and q as
(7) V(wq ) = min(z,θ ,cL,cH)qz
+ pL(θ )cL + pH(θ )cH − pH(θ )zθ
subject to the incentive constraint (6) and a condition that
the allocation actually deliver w utils, or
(8) w = pL(θ )U(cL,z(1−θ )) + pH(θ )U(cH,z(1−θ )).
In proving Lemma 1 (below), I show that the func-




1−σ implies that V(wq )=V(1 q)w
1/(1−σ ).
Since V(wq ) is a convex function of w (since 1/(1−σ )>
1),equality ofopportunity is implied.That is,while a sym-
metric lottery could conceivably be set up in which some
householdsaregivenanallocationwhichdeliversexpected
utility w1 with probability ρ and others, expected utility w2
with probability 1 − ρ , the convexity of V(wq ) implies
that this setup requires more resources than does giving
both groups an expected utility of ρ w1 + (1−ρ )w2. Such a
lottery is, thus, inefficient.
The proof of Lemma 1 also shows that this problem
exhibits a scaling property that will prove useful for con-
sideration of dynamic versions of this model. That is,
V(wq )=V(1 q)w
1/(1−σ ) precisely because the best way
to treat a group owed w utils is proportional to the best
way to treat a group owed 1 util, scaling z, cL, and cH up




The cost-minimization function V(wq ) takes the form
V(wq )=V(1 q)w
1/(1−σ ). Further, if (z(w),θ (w),cL(w),
cH(w)) denotes the cost-minimizing allocation as a func-
tion of w, then z(w)=z(1)w
1/(1−σ ), θ (w)=θ (1), cL(w)=
cL(1)w
1/(1−σ ), and cH(w)=cH(1)w
1/(1−σ ).
Proof. Consider w > 0 and the programming problem de-
ﬁned by minimizing (7) subject to (6) and (8). Without
loss, we can choose ˆ z ≡ z/w
1/(1−σ ), c ˆL ≡ cL/w
1/(1−σ ), and c ˆH
≡ cH/w
1/(1−σ ) instead of choosing (z,cL,cH) directly. (The
actual (z,cL,cH) values are simply implied by (ˆ z,c ˆL,c ˆH).)
Imposing the deﬁnitions of (ˆ z,c ˆL,c ˆH) into the programming
problem and simplifying delivers
(9) V(wq )=w
1/(1−σ )min(θ ,ˆ z,c ˆL,c ˆH)qˆ z
+ pL(θ )c ˆL + pH(θ )c ˆH − pH(θ )ˆ zθ
where the minimization is subject to


























This minimization problem is stated independently of w
and is, in fact, the minimization problem associated with
w =1 . Q.E.D.
To recap, when incentives must be provided in this
static model, equality of opportunity is attained, but equal-
ity of result is abandoned. Through no fault of their own,
the households with low output realizations have lower
consumption levels than those with high output realiza-
tions. Since the allocation is incentive-compatible, all
households indeed do the right thing and set θ = ¯ θ . The
low output households simply have the bad luck of re-
alizing µ = 0 instead of µ = 1. Inequality of result in this
model occurs not to punish the dishonest—when the al-
location is implemented, no household is dishonest—but
instead to ensure honesty. Why is this fair? It is what all
households would have agreed to if they could have cho-
sen in advance.
A Dynamic Model With Two Periods...
Now I transform the static model into a model in which
time passes. In this dynamic economy, the efficient (fair)
outcomeinvolvesinequalityofbothopportunityandresult.
Consider a two-period version of the economy just ana-
lyzed, with periods t = {0,1}. Per period preferences are
identical in this economy, and households place weight 1
on period 0 utility and weight β < 1 on period 1 utility.
The consumption good is assumed to be nonstorable.
If a household’s θ t and µt are again observable, then in
this dynamic model, society can do no better than simply
to repeat the equal land, equal consumption solution to the
static problem. But if a household’s θ t and µt are observed
by only that household, things become more complicated.
In particular, the deﬁnition of a symmetric allocation is
more complicated. For instance, land allocation is no lon-ger trivial since a household’s allocation in period 1 can
depend on its realized output in period 0. A symmetric
allocation in the two-period economy is a vector (z0,θ 0,
cL,cH,zL,zH,θ L,θ H,cLL,cLH,cHL,cHH). Here, cL and cH rep-
resent the period 0 consumption allocation for each output
realization, (zL,zH) and (θ L,θ H) represent the period 1 land
allocation and land division for each period 0 output reali-
zation, and (cLL,cLH,cHL,cHH) represents the period 1 con-
sumption allocation for each history of output realizations.
For such an allocation to be incentive-compatible, choos-
ingθ Lmustbeindividuallyrational(inperiod1)forhouse-
holds with low ﬁrst-period realizations, or
(12) pL(θ L)U(cLL,zL(1−θ L)) + pH(θ L)U(cLH,zL(1−θ L))
≥ U(cLL,zL).
Similarly,choosingθ Hmustbeindividuallyrational(inpe-
riod 1) for households with high ﬁrst-period realizations,
or
(13) pL(θ H)U(cHL,zH(1−θ H))+pH(θ H)U(cHH,zH(1−θ H))
≥ U(cHL,zH).
Finally, choosing θ 0 must be individually rational (in pe-




j∈ {L,H}pj(θ i)U(cij,zi(1−θ i))]
≥ U(cL,z0)+β
j∈ {L,H}pj(θ L)U(cLj,zL(1−θ L)).
For such an allocation to be feasible, resource con-
straints on land and consumption must hold in each pe-
riod, or
(15) z0 ≤ 1
(16) pL(θ 0)zL + pH(θ 0)zH ≤ 1
(17) pL(θ 0)cL + pH(θ 0)cH − pH(θ 0)z0θ 0 ≤ 0
(18) pL(θ 0)[pL(θ L)cLL + pH(θ L)cLH]
+ pH(θ 0)[pL(θ H)cHL + pH(θ H)cHH]
− pL(θ 0)pH(θ L)zLθ L
− pH(θ 0)pH(θ H)zHθ H ≤ 0.
An allocation (z* 0,θ * 0,c* L,c* H,z* L,z* H,θ * L,θ * H,c* LL,c* LH,c* HL,c* HH)i s
ex ante efficient (or fair by Rawls’ criterion) if it solves
(19) max(z0,θ 0,ci,zi,θ i,cij) i∈ {L,H}pi(θ 0)×
[U(ci,z0(1−θ 0)) + β
j∈ {L,H}pj(θ i)U(cij,zi(1−θ i))]
subject to conditions (12) through (18).
What can be said about a solution to this problem?
Thanks to the assumed functional form, quite a lot. We
know that a solution involves memory. Speciﬁcally, the
land a household is allocated in period 1 (which deter-
mines the household’s opportunity to produce in period 1)
depends on the household’s output in period 0. We also
know that the solution again scales. In the solution, all
households receive the same efficient land division θ , and
each household’s consumption in period 1 for each period
1 output is proportional to the household’s land in period
1, or cHH/cLH = cHL/cLL = zH/zL. Households that have a
good outcome in the ﬁrst period are simply given propor-
tionally more of everything in the second period, includ-
ing the ability to produce. In the second period, then, the
economy has equality of neither opportunity nor result.
Explaining this outcome again requires examining the
problem of minimizing the resource cost of providing w
lifetime utils, subject to incentive constraints. In the two-
period model, the relevant shadow prices are those of land
in each period (denoted by q0 and q1) in terms of period
t consumption and that of period 1 consumption in terms
of period 0 consumption (denoted by δ ). The cost-minimi-
zation problem is, then,
(20) min(z0,θ 0,ci,zi,θ i,cij)q0z0 +
i∈ {L,H}pi(θ 0)×
[ci − z0θ 0µi + δ (q1zi +
j∈ {L,H}pj(θ i)(cij−ziθ iµj))]
subject to the incentive constraints (12), (13), and (14) but
not the resource constraints on land or consumption.
The usefulness of the dual problem (cost minimization)
as opposed to the primal problem (utility maximization)
stems from the fact that the continuation of a cost-mini-
mizing allocation is itself a cost-minimizing allocation.
That is, consider a household which realizes outcome i ∈
{L,H} in the ﬁrst period. This household’s second-period
allocation is the one-period allocation {zi,θ i,ciL,ciH}. Let wi
denote the one-period expected utility associated with
{zi,θ i,ciL,ciH}. This allocation can be shown to solve the
static cost-minimization problem outlined above.
9 Thus,
the result that cHH/cLH = cHL/cLL = zH/zL has already been
proven in Lemma 1.
Note that at this point only scaling has been shown, not
memory. From what has been shown so far, it is still possi-
ble that cHH/cLH=cHL/cLL=zH/zL= 1, or that a household’s
ﬁrst-period outcome does not affect its second-period al-
location. To see that zH/zL > 1 (or households with good
outcomes in the ﬁrst period get better second-period al-
locations), we must examine the two-period problem im-
posing the result that {zi,θ i,ciL,ciH} solves the one-period
problem. That is, for each i ∈ {L,H}, instead of directly
choosing {zi,θ i,ciL,ciH}, choose wi with the understanding
that wi implies {zi,θ i,ciL,ciH} through the static minimiza-
tion problem. Then the cost-minimization problem is
(21) min(z0,θ 0,ci,wi) q0z0
+




subject to the ﬁrst-period incentive constraint
(22) pL(θ 0)[U(cL,z0(1−θ 0)) + β w′L]
+ pH(θ 0)[U(cH,z0(1−θ 0)) + β w′H]
≥ U(cL,z0)+β w′L
and the ﬁrst-period promise-keeping condition(23) w = pL(θ 0)[U(cL,z0(1−θ 0)) + β w′L]
+ pH(θ 0)[U(cH,z0(1−θ 0)) + β w′H].
The proof of Lemma 2 (below) shows that wH > wL, or
that the efficient allocation for this economy has memory.
LEMMA 2. Memory
Second-period utility following a high ﬁrst-period output
realization is greater than second-period utility following
a low ﬁrst-period output realization: wH > wL.
Proof. Suppose that (z* 0,θ * 0,c* i,w* i) solves the cost-minimi-
zation problem (21) with wH = wL = w*. Since otherwise
ﬁrst-period production equals zero, θ * 0 = ¯ θ . Next, consider
the following perturbation: wH = w*+x/π H,w L = w*−
x/π L, where x is arbitrary. With this setup, a choice of x =
0 should be optimal. Note that as x varies, the effect on ex
ante utility is zero; thus, the promise-keeping constraint is
not affected, and neither is the left side of the incentive
constraint. But the right side of the incentive constraint is
decreased as x increases; as x increases, the incentive
constraint is loosened. Since without the incentive con-
straint a solution involves cL = cH, the incentive constraint
is binding, so loosening it has positive value. The deriva-
tive of the objective function with respect to x equals
(24) δ V(1 q1)[(w*+x/π H)
σ /(1−σ ) −( w*−x/π L)
σ /(1−σ )]
which at x = 0 equals zero. Thus, x = 0 is not optimal. A
similar argument rules out wH < wL. Q.E.D.
To recap, in the two-period model, incentive issues en-
sure that both equality of result and equality of opportunity
(in the second period) are abandoned. In this dynamic
model, as in the static model, in the ﬁrst period households
with low output realizations—again, through no fault of
theirown—havelowerconsumptionlevelsthanthosewith
high output realizations. Further, these low output realiza-
tions follow them into the second period. The households
with low output realizations receive smaller land alloca-
tions and, for each second-period output realization, pro-
portionally less of the consumption good than households
with high output realizations. Further still, this dependence
of the second-period allocation on ﬁrst-period outcomes is
not necessary to ensure that θ = ¯ θ . From behind the veil,
the households could have chosen to retain equality of
opportunity in the second period and still have θ = ¯ θ
simply by repeating the solution to the static model. They
choose not to do this simply because they can do better ex
ante by introducing memory. Again, this is fair because it
is what all households would have agreed to in advance.
. . . And With Inﬁnite Periods
Now I extend the time line of the dynamic two-period
model to inﬁnity: periods t = {0,1,...,∞ }. In this inﬁnite-
period economy, per period preferences are identical, and
households place weight β
t on period t utility. We shall
see that the theoretical results from the last model hold
here as well, but that the extension of time adds extreme
implications on inequality as the economy ages. In par-
ticular, as t →∞ , inequality goes to inﬁnity as almost all
land and consumption go to a vanishingly small fraction
of the population. Thus, in the ex ante efficient allocation,
the economy not only has inequality of opportunity and
result; eventually, it has as much of both kinds of inequal-
ity as is possible.
This result comes from the combination of an inﬁnite
numberofperiodsandthreefactorsofthetwo-periodmod-
el:
• Land is in ﬁxed supply.
• Allocations scale. (Lemma 1 holds.)
• Households with high output realizations receive
better future allocations than do households with
low output realizations. (Lemma 2 holds.)
As argued above, scaling occurs regardless of the shad-
ow prices of land and consumption in each period. These
shadow prices affect how to treat a household owed 1 util,
but don’t affect the fact that the best way to treat all other
households is proportional to this. Suppose the shadow
prices were such that the cost-minimizing way to treat a
household owed 1 util has the household’s expected land
allocation higher or lower in period t + 1 than in period t.
Then this situation would hold for all households in period
t. If all households have their land allocation increasing or
decreasing in expectation, then the aggregate land alloca-
tion is increasing or decreasing with certainty. But this is
impossible since land is in ﬁxed supply. Thus, shadow
prices must be such that every household’s expected land
allocation in period t + 1 equals its actual land allocation
in period t. That is, land allocation is a martingale, a sto-
chastic process with the property that its expectation in
period t + 1 equals its value in period t. Since a house-
hold’s conditional consumption in each period is propor-
tional to its land allocation, the implications of land being
a martingale hold for consumption as well.
To deliver the result that, eventually, almost all house-
holds get arbitrarily little land (and consumption), with al-
most all land (and consumption) going to a vanishingly
small fraction of the population, we need more than scal-
ing and land in ﬁxed supply. Land tomorrow must also be
used as an incentive device today. Note that for the inﬁn-
ite-period economy, except for the distribution of prom-
ised utilities, every period is exactly the same as every
other period; no period is closer to the end of time. But
scaling implies that the distribution of utilities is essential-
ly irrelevant. (For a detailed justiﬁcation, see my 1994
work.) Thus, the shadow price of land never changes, and
neither does the price of future consumption. So the best
way to treat a household owed 1 util never changes, and
Lemma 2 (wH > wL) continues to hold. Suppose a house-
hold owed 1 util gets z units of land in period t and gets
zL or zH in period t + 1 if it has a low or high realization
in period t. We know that π LzL + π HzH = z and that zL and
zH are the same for all t. Further, scaling implies that a
household which has 2z units of land in period t gets 2zH
or 2zL in period t +1 .
How do these facts imply eventual extreme inequality?
Suppose that π L = π H = 1/2, zL = (1/2)z, and zH = (3/2)z,
or that every day a household either loses half its land
holdings or increases them by 50 percent. (The numbers
do not matter. The following reasoning holds for all
(π L,π H) adding to 1 and zH > zL with expected value z.) If
a household starting with z0 has a high realization and
then a low realization (or a low and then a high), its land
holdings after two periods are (3/4)z0. If high then low or
low then high occurs again, the household’s land holdingsafter four periods are (9/16)z0. (Every two periods, the
household loses a quarter of its land.) Over time, if the
household keeps receiving exactly half high and half low
realizations, then its land holdings converge to zero. But
note that the law of large numbers implies that as t →∞ ,
almost all households have arbitrarily close to half their
realizations high and half low. Thus, almost all households
have their land holdings converge to zero. Eventually, ex-
pectedutilityaveragedacrosshouseholdsisarbitrarilylow.
Why is such an allocation agreed to from behind the
veil? The key to this is that the standard from behind the
veilisexpecteddiscountedutility(β <1).Beforetheworld
begins, how it will eventually look is of little importance
to those who exponentially discount the future. Neverthe-
less, in each period, making the future depend on the cur-
rentrealizationalwaysloosenstheincentiveconstraint,and
thus, in each period, adding at least a little more inequality
makes sense.
Reinterpreting Time
From the perspective of the beginning of time, in the ef-
ﬁcient allocation of the inﬁnite-period model, all house-
holds receive the same allocation. This is, in fact, implicit
in the deﬁnition of a fair allocation. Thus, from this per-
spective, the model has equality of opportunity. But from
the perspective of any later period, the model no longer
has that equality. A household’s past stays with it forever
and directly affects its ability to produce through its land
allocation.
This distinction becomes more important depending on
how time is interpreted in the model. If a time period is
interpreted as one period in the long life of a single in-
dividual, then this model could perhaps be considered as
having equality of opportunity, accompanied by ever-in-
creasing inequality of result. However, a time period could
also be interpreted as an entire lifetime of a member of a
dynastic household that cares about its descendants (al-
though discounting by β ). The allocation in the inﬁnite-
period model is exactly the allocation the ﬁrst generation
would choose when setting up society. That society can-
not be considered as having equality of opportunity for
any but the ﬁrst generation.
But is this allocation, under Rawls’ criterion, truly fair?
Speciﬁcally, from behind the veil of ignorance, the alloca-
tion in the inﬁnite-period model is the one agreed to only
if the ﬁrst generation is the only one whose preferences
matter. From the perspective of someone born into a later
generation, inequality of opportunity (dependence of a lat-
er generation’s allocation on its ancestors’ outcomes) is
simply a welfare-reducing lottery.
To handle this case, suppose the veil also hides which
generation an agent will be born into. Then the behind-
the-veil agent would put greater weight than β
t on the
utility of the tth generation. For instance, consider a two-
generation economy (t ∈ {0,1}) in which parents (those
born in period 0) put weight 2/3 on their own utility and
weight 1/3 on their children’s. (This corresponds to β =
1/2.) However, the children in this economy (those born
in period 1) care only for themselves. Given this, if from
behind the veil an agent sees a 50 percent chance of being
a parent or a child, the agent puts weight 1/3 on ﬁrst-
generation utility and weight 2/3 on second-generation
utility. Formally, the problem appears as one in which the
discount rate of the agents from behind the veil is differ-
ent from the discount rate of the households actually in
society. (For discussion of the appropriate societal rate of
discount, see the 2001 work of Andrew Caplin and John
Leahy.)
If the discount rate of agents behind the veil differs
from that of the households in society, the analysis of this
model becomes considerably more complicated. In par-
ticular, scaling does not necessarily hold. Nevertheless, for
a simpliﬁed version of the two-period model, we can di-
rectly compute examples.
For example, with α = 0.5, σ = 0.5, ¯ θ = 0.5, and π L =
π H = 0.5, the static model implies that cL = 0.11 and cH =
0.39 (which average to π H¯ θ = 0.25). If agents from behind
the veil put weight 1/3 on period 0 utility and weight 2/3
on period 1 utility (the case in which β = 1/2 and parents
care about children but children do not care about par-
ents), then the resulting allocation is not a repetition of the
static model’s. Instead, cL = 0.13, cH = 0.37, zL = 0.85, zH
= 1.15, cLL = 0.09, cLH = 0.33, cHL = 0.12, and cHH = 0.45.
That is, the ﬁrst generation’s consumption is less variable
here than in the static model while the second generation’s
consumption and land allocation depend on its parents’
output realization. In this example, agents from behind the
veil prefer inequality of opportunity for the second gen-
eration even when the second generation matters directly
as opposed to mattering only through the altruism of its
parents. In fact, for every interior weighting scheme and
altruism level attempted, the computed solution always






vice as a fairness criterion to evaluate social policies and
applied it to a contracting model in which the terms equal-
ity of opportunity and equality of result are well deﬁned.
My results suggest that fairness and inequality—even ex-
treme inequality—are compatible. In a static world, when
incentives must be provided, fairness implies equality of
opportunity but inequality of result. In a dynamic world of
long-lived individuals, fairness implies not only inequality
of result; it also implies, eventually, inﬁnite inequality of
result. If each period of this dynamic model is interpreted
as a generation, then eventual inﬁnite inequality holds for
opportunity as well, subject to the condition that fairness is
from the perspective of the ﬁrst generation, that later gen-
erations matter only through the ﬁrst generation’s altruism.
A computed example shows that if the preferences of later
generations are explicitly taken into account, inequality of
opportunity still occurs, although perhaps not at extreme
levels.
*Also Adjunct Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota. The author
thanks Marco Bassetto, Aubhik Khan, Narayana Kocherlakota, Robert Lucas, Kathy
Rolfe, and Art Rolnick for valuable comments.
1There are, of course, major exceptions to this general tendency. Work by Nobel
laureates James Mirrlees and Amartya Sen and many other mainstream economists
focuses on normative, distributional issues. Further, many economists will say in-
equality is “getting worse” rather than simply “increasing.” Nevertheless, most econ-
omistsagreethatsuchlanguage,whilenotnecessarilyincorrect,goesagainstatradition
in the profession of not making value judgments.
2Examples of this literature include the work of Stephen Spear and Sanjay
Srivastava (1987), Jonathan Thomas and Tim Worrall (1990), and Robert Townsend
and me (1991). The model in this study borrows essential characteristics from the workof Andrew Atkeson and Robert Lucas (1992) and Aubhik Khan and B. Ravikumar
(2001).
3In Khan and Ravikumar 2001, capital plays a role similar to that which land plays
here. The difference is that here land is in ﬁxed supply.
4Requiring that σ < 1 puts a limit on the risk aversion of households. If σ≥ 1
(where, as usual, σ = 1 implies that U(c,z(1− θ ))= log(c
α [z(1− θ )]
1−α ), then exposition
becomes more difficult, but my main results still hold.
5If θ = 0, then output equals zero and, thus, cL = cH = 0. This gives a utility of
zero (or −∞ if σ≥ 1). But cL = cH = π H¯ θ gives positive utility (or ﬁnite utility if σ≥
1). To see that cL = cH, suppose that (cL ,cH) satisﬁes the resource constraint, but cL ≠
cH. Setting cL = cH = π H¯ θ also satisﬁes the resource constraint with equality and in-
creases the objective function value since the objective function is concave.
6For simplicity, assume that this ability to divert is one-way. A household can
divert land intended for production to its private use, but cannot divert land intended
for its private use to production.
7A qualiﬁcation: If σ is above a critical value (greater than one), then adequate in-
centives to allow θ = ¯ θ cannot be provided without setting cL = 0, which ensures that
expected utility equals minus inﬁnity. Then the economy has many optimal allocations,
all of which imply this worst-case expected utility.
8If σ > 1, then utility is negative and V(wq )=V(−1 q)(−w)
1/1−σ , which is also
convex.
9ThisisestablishedbyargumentsfromSpearandSrivastava(1987)andTownsend
and me (1991), which rely on the work of Dilip Abreu, David Pearce, and Ennio
Stacchetti (1986, 1990).
10In related work (Phelan 2002), I prove that in the two-period moral hazard
problem of William Rogerson (1985), efficiency requires that the consumption of
children depend on the outcomes of their parents as long as parents care about their
children and that the parents’ incentive constraint bind in the social planner’s problem
(which occurs quite generally). Recent work by Scott Freeman and Michael Sadler
(2002), however, argues in a similar model that if parents are free to choose bequests,
children’s consumption depends too much on parental outcomes compared to what
would be chosen by a social planner that maximizes steady-state expected lifetime
utility.
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